Is flexibility or formality more useful for organizations that are pursuing improved performance? Organizational structure scholars offer opposing answers to this question, and empirical results have been mixed. Our study contributes to this research by describing a mediational model that links organizational flexibility to performance via opportunity exploitation. Specifically, we argue that flexible firms are able to exploit a greater number of opportunities, which, in turn, can improve performance. We also argue that the indirect effect of flexibility on performance via (...) opportunity exploitation is stronger when top executives display higher affective commitment for their firms, meaning that they have a positive emotional attachment to their firms. Top executives with higher affective commitment can mitigate the downsides experienced by the staff of flexible firms, such as uncertainty and negative affect, which improves the outcomes of flexibility. Drawing on a sample of 211 firms and their founders, we find support for our hypotheses. (shrink)

Le XVIIIe colloque international Cioran (2013) a été dédié au thème des "Transfigurations". Les actes du colloque témoignent des différentes approches (philosophique, historique, poétique, littéraire et linguistique) abordées par les chercheurs, universitaires, philosophes ou écrivains venus à Sibiu.

The works of Clive L. Spash provided inspiration to many. In the case of my own theoretical and philosophical journey, Spash's social-ecological economics became an important grounding. However, apart from directing this journey, his works have been a major influence in another domain: the domain of my personal being in and relating with the world. This paper explicates this side of Spash's influence. The paper's roots specifically go back to Spash’s work on new foundations for ecological economics and the invitation (...) he extended to his fellow humans to act personally and consistently with one's environmental and social values. Far from glorifying the mode of being, here referred to as being of deep transformations, I aim to draw others’ attention to the challenges and constraints. (shrink)

This essay articulates a convergence between Foucault and Agamben: the possibility of an uncomplicated belonging to the profane, or to the perfect time of human experience. Agamben articulates a sense of experience as experience that “tears me from myself,” that points to a transformed conception of the world and a body and that connects his thinking to Foucault’s. This article places Agamben with Foucault outside of the alternative between messianism and pessimism. In the “perfect time of human experience,” in potentiality, (...) possibility, and absolute immanence, Agamben finds a way of experiencing, a path along which philosophy has always wanted to step, one that I argue is taken in Foucault’s bio-politics. (shrink)

This essay articulates a convergence between Foucault and Agamben: the possibility of an uncomplicated belonging to the profane, or to the perfect time of human experience. Agamben articulates a sense of experience as experience that “tears me from myself,” that points to a transformed conception of the world and a body and that connects his thinking to Foucault’s. This article places Agamben with Foucault outside of the alternative between messianism and pessimism. In the “perfect time of human experience,” in potentiality, (...) possibility, and absolute immanence, Agamben finds a way of experiencing, a path along which philosophy has always wanted to step, one that I argue is taken in Foucault’s bio-politics. (shrink)

This essay articulates a convergence between Foucault and Agamben: the possibility of an uncomplicated belonging to the profane, or to the perfect time of human experience. Agamben articulates a sense of experience as experience that “tears me from myself,” that points to a transformed conception of the world and a body and that connects his thinking to Foucault’s. This article places Agamben with Foucault outside of the alternative between messianism and pessimism. In the “perfect time of human experience,” in potentiality, (...) possibility, and absolute immanence, Agamben finds a way of experiencing, a path along which philosophy has always wanted to step, one that I argue is taken in Foucault’s bio-politics. (shrink)

The article articulates a point of convergence between Foucault and Agamben, with a view to reinforcing a common direction in their thought, namely, the possibility of an uncomplicated belonging to the profane, or to the perfect time of human experience. KEY WORDS – Agamben. Foucault. Human experience. Modernity. Political philosophy.

O artigo articula um ponto de convergência entre Foucault e Agamben, de forma a sublinhar uma confluência em seus pensamentos, a saber, a possibilidade de um pertencer nãocomplicado ao profano, ou ao tempo perfeito da experiência humana. PALAVRAS-CHAVE – Agamben. Experiência humana. Filosofia política. Foucault. Modernidade.

(revisions posted 12/5/2006) to appear in Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology, ed. by Sanford Goldberg (to be published by Oxford in 2006 or 2007) Michael McKinsey formulated an argument that raises a puzzle about the relation between externalism about content and our introspective awareness of content. The puzzle goes like this: it seems like I can know the contents of my thoughts by introspection alone; but philosophical reflection tells me that the contents of those thoughts are externalist, and (...) so I couldn. (shrink)

Something about this argument sounds funny. As we’ll see, though, it takes some care to identify exactly what Moore has done wrong. Iwill assume that Moore knows premise (2) to be true. One could inquire into how he knows it, and whether that knowledge can be defeated; but Iwon’t. I’ll focus instead on what epistemic relations Moore has to premise (1) and to his conclusion (3). It may matter which epistemic relations we choose to consider. Some philosophers will diagnose Moore’s (...) argument using Contextualist machinery. They’ll say. (shrink)

Consider the skeptic about the external world. Let’s straightaway concede to such a skeptic that perception gives us no conclusive or certain knowledge about our surroundings. Our perceptual justification for beliefs about our surroundings is always defeasible—there are always possible improvements in our epistemic state which would no longer support those beliefs. Let’s also concede to the skeptic that it’s metaphysically possible for us to have all the experiences we’re now having while all those experiences are false. Some philosophers dispute (...) this, but I do not. The skeptic I want to consider goes beyond these familiar points to the much more radical conclusion that our perceptual experiences can’t give us any knowledge or even justification for believing that our surroundings are one way rather than another. (shrink)

We have several intuitive paradigms of defeating evidence. For example, let E be the fact that Ernie tells me that the notorious pet Precious is a bird. This supports the premise F, that Precious can fly. However, Orna gives me *opposing* evidence. She says that Precious is a dog. Alternatively, defeating evidence might not oppose Ernie's testimony in that direct way. There might be other ways for it to weaken the support that Ernie's testimony gives me for believing F, without (...) the new evidence itself intuitively constituting reasons to believe one way or the other about Precious's flight ability. An example: Ursula tells me that Ernie has no idea what Precious's species is; he's just guessing. She may not herself want to or be in a position to weigh in about Precious's real species or flight ability. I call defeating evidence of this sort *undermining evidence. (shrink)

Consider the argument: Circus-1 Men in clown suits are handing out tickets. So, probably: Circus-2 There’s a circus in town. So: Circus-3 There’s an entertainment venue in town. Presumably you’d be able to warrantedly believe Circus-2 on the basis of Circus-1. And we can suppose you’re reasonably certain that wherever there are circuses, there are entertainment venues. So you’d seem to be in a position to reasonably go on to infer Circus-3.

There is much I agree with in Sosa’s paper. His discussion of Stine and Peirce is quite useful; so too his discussion of Dretske in Appendix II. A further issue he focuses on concerns how Contextualists are to give full endorsement to the knowledge-claims of ordinary subjects. Just saying, metalinguistically, that.

Dogmatism is a claim about a possible epistemic position, not about the metaphysics of what puts us in that position. So, for example, it leaves it open whether the intrinsic nature of a perceiving subject’s state is the same as that of a hallucinating subject’s state.

Soames thinks the dependencies show up in the semantics if they are generated by variable binding. That will only partially overlap with Pinillos's ambitions for the notion of de jure codesignation. This chapter contributes towards 'domesticating' the kind of predicates that fans of de jure codesignation are friendly to, that is, making them seem less alien and somewhat less 'magical'. It surveys a novel kind of semantic structure that has been posited by Mark Richard, Kit Fine, Ángel Pinillos, and others. (...) It focuses on anaphora, especially cases that cannot be handled by a 'bound‐variable' analysis, and distinguishes our target view from other treatments of anaphora. The chapter discusses the semantics of attitude reports and discusses two kinds of complex anaphoric dependency. It explains a difference in how functions in a programming language can be sensitive to the identity of their operands. (shrink)

In this book, Frederic L. Pryor uses the concept of structural complexity to show how changes in the population, the labour force, the structure of industry, the financial system, foreign and domestic trade, and the government sector are related to the same general trend in the US economic system. He also investigates the impact of these changes on the functioning of the system, exploring such matters as the long-term rising unemployment rate, the allegedly increasing volatility of the economy, the (...) changing degree of competition, and the evolving economic role of the government. The discussion is aimed at those who wish to view the economy as a whole and who are concerned with problems of understanding an economy that is becoming increasingly complex along many different dimensions. For specialists a number of appendices discuss a variety of technical issues. (shrink)

Essays consider Drucilla Cornell’s contributions to philosophy, political theory, and legal studies.

Bringing a postcolonial perspective to UK constitutional debates and including a detailed and comparative engagement with the constitutions of Britain’s ex-colonies, this book is an original reflection upon the relationship between the written and the unwritten constitution. Can a nation have an unwritten constitution? While written constitutions both found and define modern nations, Britain is commonly regarded as one of the very few exceptions to this rule. Drawing on a range of theories concerning writing, law and violence, _Constitutions _makes a (...) theoretical intervention into conventional constitutional analyses by problematizing the notion of a ‘written constitution’ on which they are based. Situated within the frame of the former British empire, this book deconstructs the conventional opposition between the ‘margins’ and the ‘centre’, as well as between the ‘written’ and ‘unwritten’, by paying very close, detailed attention to the constitutional texts under consideration. Pryor argues that Britain’s ‘unwritten’ constitution and ‘immemorial’ common law only take on meaning in a relation of difference with the written constitutions of its former colonies. These texts, in turn, draw on this pre-literate origin in order to legitimize themselves. The ‘unwritten’ constitution of Britain can therefore be located and dislocated in postcolonial written constitutions. _Constitutions _is an excellent addition to the bookshelves of all students of the philosophy of law, political theory, constitutional and administrative law and jurisprudence. (shrink)

_Essays consider Drucilla Cornell’s contributions to philosophy, political theory, and legal studies._.

Social learning and imitation is central to culture in cetaceans. The training technology used with cetaceans facilitates reinforcing imitation of one dolphin's behavior by another; the same technology, now widely used by pet owners, can lead to imitative learning in such unlikely species as dogs and horses. A capacity for imitation, and thus for cultural learning, may exist in many species.

We will be considering the three topics of my title—or as we might also call them, reasoning, rationally responding, and logic. In many philosophers’ minds these are loosely but firmly connected. Too firmly. It’s not easy to identify a rigorous thesis they definitely accept and I definitely reject. But I will be urging these three notions are farther apart and explanatorily more independent than is usually assumed. Most notably, I’ll be opposing “Closure Principles” for reasonable belief (in ways that I (...) think don’t depend on the details of how such principles are formulated). (shrink)

By way of the complex topography of the Phaedrus, Plato raises the question of his authorship and the consequences it has for the reader’s reception of Socrates, by likening Socrates’ changing status in the text to the complex mythological traditions surrounding the rape and abduction of Helen of Troy (amidst a grove of plane trees). As Socrates is likened to the excessive and “duplicitous” Helen and her various “eidolic” apeareances, the question of the dialogue appears to shift from “who is (...) Socrates?” to a more postmodern formulation: which Socrates? (shrink)

By way of the complex topography of the Phaedrus, Plato raises the question of his authorship and the consequences it has for the reader’s reception of Socrates, by likening Socrates’ changing status in the text to the complex mythological traditions surrounding the rape and abduction of Helen of Troy (amidst a grove of plane trees). As Socrates is likened to the excessive and “duplicitous” Helen and her various “eidolic” apeareances, the question of the dialogue appears to shift from “who is (...) Socrates?” to a more postmodern formulation: which Socrates? (shrink)

Abstract Emergence theory has generated many significant new questions for dialogue between theology and science. My work will examine the models of one emergence theorist, Terrence Deacon, and consider the constructive potential of Tillich's multidimensional unity of life for responding to the theological ramifications of this account of emergence theory. Such a Tillich-inspired constructive process will rely upon Robert Russell's method of “Creative Mutual Interaction.” Building on the interactive quality of Russell's method, I will also begin to offer suggestions for (...) how Tillich's theological themes might influence scientific research programs using Deacon's emergence theory by contributing to the process of defining life. Finally, I will conclude by identifying three facets of continued research that stem from this analysis, focusing primarily on its implications for theological anthropology and what it means to be in the image of God. (shrink)

I. Pryor on McKinsey: " A. Pryor’s Version of McKinsey-style Reasoning 1. Given authoritative self-knowledge, I can usually tell the contents of my own thoughts just by introspection. So I can know the following claim on the basis of reflection alone: " McK-1: I am thinking a thought with the content _water puts out fires_.

My aim in this paper is to show the difficulty James Pryor faces in attempting to overcome the skeptic’s challenge. According to the skeptic, we can never know anything about the external world, because of our cognitive limitation that cannot distinguish real perceptions from false ones in the skeptical scenarios. Thus, the skeptic requires us having antecedent justification to rule out all possible hypotheses. In opposition to the skeptic, Pryor argues that as long as we remain dogmatic about (...) perception, we can have “prima facie justification” for perceptual beliefs, which does not rest on any antecedent justification. Furthermore, on thebasis of prima facie justification, Pryor goes on to justify the existence of the external world, which by itself excludes various skeptical hypotheses. However, I shall argue that since Pryor’s prima facie justification only considers perceptual justification, it cannot show whether skeptical hypotheses are true or false, and thus, fails to give a convincing solution to the skeptic. Nevertheless, I still believe that dogmatism is worthy of notice in that it offers a plausible explanation of our ordinary perceptual beliefs by the notion of “entitlement to rely. (shrink)

Author: Krasiński Andrzej Title: IAN HACKING’S THE CONCEPT OF LABORATORY SCIENCE (Nauki laboratoryjne w ujęciu Iana Hackinga) Source: Filo-Sofija year: 2011, vol:.12, number: 2011/1, pages: 385-396 Keywords: LABORATORY SCIENCE, NEW EXPERIMENTALISM, PHILOSOPHY OF EXPERIMENT, STABILITY OF SCIENCE Discipline: PHILOSOPHY Language: POLISH Document type: ARTICLE Publication order reference (Primary author’s office address): E-mail: www:In this text I focus attention on the concept of laboratory science created by Ian Hacking, According to Hacking’s theory, not all scientific experiments are laboratory experiments. Laboratory (...) science created phenomena that seldom or never occur in a pure state in nature. In the second part of the text I analyze Hacking’s division of elements of laboratory science. There are three groups of elements: intellectual components, material things and results of experiment, in short: ideas, things and marks. The elements of laboratory in Hacking’s theory are used directly in the course of the experiment. Laboratory sciences are stable. Each element can be modified in order to match to each other. The stability of laboratory science is result of fact that theory and the laboratory equipment evolve in that way, that they match each other and mutually self-vindicating. (shrink)

“Moorean Dogmatist” responses to external world skepticism endorse courses of reasoning that many people find objectionable. This paper seeks to locate this dissatisfaction in considerations about epistemic responsibility. I sketch a theory of immediate warrant and show how it can be combined with plausible “inferential internalist” demands arising from considerations of epistemic responsibility. The resulting view endorses immediate perceptual warrant but forbids the sort of reasoning that “Moorean Dogmatism” would allow. A surprising result is that Dogmatism’s commitment to immediate epistemic (...) warrant isn’t enough to avoid certain standard arguments for skepticism about the external world. (shrink)

It is argued that Pryor's criticism of scepticism of perceptual justification misses the point: while Pryor's dogmatism can provide a successful explication of the perceptual justification of first order empirical beliefs ( i.e. , an explication of propositional justification), it is barren vis à vis second order sceptical criticisms about the epistemic status of beliefs justified via perception (that is, criticisms pointing to the lack of doxastic justification). We argue that the two main motivations that Pryor offers (...) for his dogmatism – to avoid scepticism of perceptual justification and to explicate perceptual justification – fail due to his commitment with some externalist theses, which make it impossible to satisfy the metaepistemic requisites imposed by the sceptic. Hence given the lack of satisfaction of Pryor's own goals, we conclude that Pryor's dogmatism is not an adequate explication of perceptual justification. (shrink)

Objective: To report results from a national survey of coordinators and managers of clinical research studies in the US on their perceptions of and experiences with scientific misconduct.Methods: Data were collected using the Scientific Misconduct Questionnaire-Revised. Eligible responses were received from 1645 of 5302 surveys sent to members of the Association of Clinical Research Professionals and to subscribers of Research Practitioner, published by the Center for Clinical Research Practice, between February 2004 and January 2005.Findings: Overall, the perceived frequency of misconduct (...) was low. Differences were noted between workplaces with regard to perceived pressures on investigators and research coordinators, and on the effectiveness of the regulatory environment in reducing misconduct. First-hand experience with an incident of misconduct was reported by 18% of respondents. Those with first-hand knowledge of misconduct were more likely to report working in an academic medical setting, and to report that a typical research coordinator would probably do nothing if aware that a principal investigator or research staff member was involved in an incident of misconduct.Conclusion: These findings expand the knowledge on scientific misconduct by adding new information from the perspective of research coordinators. The findings provide some data supporting the influence of workplace climate on misconduct and also on the perceived effectiveness of institutional policies to reduce scientific misconduct. (shrink)

Humanitarian social enterprises (HSEs) are facing mounting pressure to incorporate social innovation into their practice. This study thus identifies how HSEs leverage organizational capabilities toward developing social innovation. Specifically, it considers how resource scarcity and operating circumstances affect the capabilities used by HSEs for developing social innovation, using a longitudinal case study approach with qualitative data from 12 hunger-relief HSEs operating in the United States. Based on 59 interviews with 31 managers and directors and related documents, several propositions are posited. (...) The findings suggest that resource availability (i.e., scarcity vs. abundance) leads some HSEs to focus on developing social innovation using their collaborative capabilities, while others leverage their absorptive capacity. Further, HSEs adjust their approach to developing social innovation based on whether they are operating in ordinary circumstances (i.e., before the COVID pandemic) or extraordinary ones (i.e., during the COVID pandemic). Interestingly, the findings suggest that the organizational capabilities used by HSEs are adjusted as these enterprises become more familiar with extraordinary operating circumstances. For example, at the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, resource-scarce HSEs focused on parallel bricolage to develop social innovation. Subsequently, they focused on selective bricolage. The findings offer novel insights by relating the social innovation of social enterprises to crisis management. (shrink)

Values -- Tolerance -- Tolerant people -- Being tolerant of family -- Being tolerant of friends -- Being tolerant of neighbours -- Ways to be tolerant -- Being aware of others -- Respecting different kinds of families -- Accepting other cultures -- Including others -- Learning from others -- Being patient -- Personal set of values.

In transformation research of late, accounts on the relation between intentionality and agency on the one hand, and the more routinised and structured side of social co-existence on the other, are increasingly nuanced. However, we observe a deficiency in the way arguments are set up by the interlocutors: both, scholars who grant intentionality a central role and those who emphasise its limitations generally do so at the level of ontology – debating degrees of human capacity for conscious planning versus a (...) largely unconscious reproduction. We wish to shift this question from an ontological to a pedagogical one, exploring possibilities to cultivate and learn intentionality. We do so by developing the concept of consciousness-in-nature that we derive from, and contextualise in, the traditions of deep ecology and (Westernised) Buddhism which both view human beings as inseparable from nature and one another. With consciousness-in-nature we refer to an understanding of humans as a part of nature that has developed the capacity for (self-) reflection and deliberation – a capacity that is not static or firm but can be nurtured and cultivated or clouded over and subdued. From this standpoint, we lay out an understanding of the role of (re)learning consciousness for processes of social change and explore potentials for its nurturing. (shrink)

_the a priori role_ (for word T). For instance, perhaps anyone who understands the word _water_ is able to know, without appeal to any further a posteriori information, that _water_ refers to the clear, drinkable natural kind whose instances are predominant in our oceans and lakes (if _water_ refers at all.

In the last few years there has been a resurgence of interest in Moore’s Proof of the existence of an external world, which is now often rendered as follows:1 (I) Here’s a hand (II) If there is a hand here, there is an external world Therefore (III) There is an external world The contemporary debate has been mostly triggered by Crispin Wright’s influential—conservative —“Facts and certainty” and further fostered by Jim Pryor’s recent—liberal—“What’s wrong with Moore’s argument?”.2 This debate is (...) worth surveying with care because—so I shall contend—it will help us see that, in fact, it allows for an important view that, so far, hasn’t been explicitly considered. The critical survey will be the task of the next two sections, while, in the remaining.. (shrink)

This article surveys work in epistemology since the mid-1980s. It focuses on contextualism about knowledge attributions, modest forms of foundationalism, and the internalism/externalism debate and its connections to the ethics of belief.

According to Jim Pryor’s dogmatism, if you have an experience as if P, you acquire immediate prima facie justification for believing P. Pryor contends that dogmatism validates Moore’s infamous proof of a material world. Against Pryor, I argue that if dogmatism is true, Moore’s proof turns out to be non-transmissive of justification according to one of the senses of non-transmissivity defined by Crispin Wright. This type of non-transmissivity doesn’t deprive dogmatism of its apparent antisceptical bite.

I argue that Frege Problems in thought are best modeled using graph-theoretic machinery; and that these problems can arise even when subjects associate all the same qualitative properties to the object they’re thinking of twice. I compare the proposed treatment to similar ideas by Heck, Ninan, Recanati, Kamp and Asher, Fodor, and others.

What are reasons? For example, if you’re aware that your secretary plans to expose you, and you resign to avoid a scandal, what is your reason for resigning? Is your reason the fact that your secretary plans to expose you? If so, what kinds of facts are eligible to be reasons? Can merely possible facts be reasons (for actual subjects)? Can merely apparent facts? Or are reasons rather attitudes? Are your reasons for resigning your belief that your secretary plans to (...) expose you, and your desire to avoid a scandal? Or are reasons propositions? If so, which propositions? Only propositions that the subject believes and desires? Only propositions that are true? (On some views, those will be facts; on other views, not.). (shrink)